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Introduction 
In November 2016, at the halfway point of the First World War Centenary, a modest 
exhibition based on volunteer research and supported by the UK Heritage Lottery 
Fund opened in the London suburb of Wood Green.  Far from the Western Front 
presented accounts of South Asian servicemen who served across the many theatres 
of war. It was only mounted for a few days, but it sought to complicate both the 
dominant British narrative of the First World War as trench warfare in France and 
Belgium, and common depiction of the British forces as white. By focusing on the 
‘untold stories of South Asians whose crucial contribution shaped the First World 
War’ the exhibit sought to remind (or inform) visitors that ‘there was more to the 
First World War than mud and trenches of Europe’. The exhibit rediscovered stories 
that sought to shift common perceptions of the Great War in England and introduce 
alternative threats and hardships into the collective memory of the War: ‘the threat 
of lions on patrol in East Africa, thirst in the 50 degree heat of the Sinai desert, and 
starvation at the Siege of Kut’.1 
 
Yet if such broader experiences were common to many millions of people outside of 
Europe in 1914-18, the representation of this aspect of the Great War was in a 
decidedly minor key in 2014-18.  David Olusoga argues that ‘the First World War has 
a unique characteristic that has – among another consequences – come to submerge 
the war’s multinational, multi-ethnic and multiracial dimensions’. 2   This book 
explores why this was the case and engages directly with the question of how race 
and empire were understood during the war, and how subaltern narratives were 
recognised, forgotten and commemorated one hundred years later.  It shows why 
and how non-national narratives of region, race and empire were elided, forgotten 
and occasionally commemorated in particular ways at particular times and in 
particular places during the First World War centenary.   
 
At its core is the argument that this process of remembering and forgetting has been 
conditioned in three important ways: 
 
																																																								
1 See https://southasiansoldiers.org.uk/far-from-the-western-front-the-exhibition/ accessed 28 
November 2016. 
2 David Olusoga, The World’s War. The Forgotten Soldiers of Empire (London: Head of Zeus, 2014), 39. 
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1. What gets commemorated and by whom in 2014-18 is significantly 
conditioned by the demands of the nation-state within the dynamics of the 
international state system – in this sense commemoration is shaped 
horizontally; 
 
2. What gets commemorated and by whom in 2014-18 has already been 
conditioned by the (mis)representation of subaltern groups during and 
immediately after the First World War itself – here, historical representation 
slices vertically through time to shape contemporary commemoration; 
 
3. The ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ aspects of contemporary memory and 
commemoration are complicated by scale of governance at the metropolitan, 
regional, state and international levels. Scale thus transects commemoration, 
opening up the possibility of alternative memories at the local and 
international levels, where they are more able and likely to emerge than at 
that of the nation-state with its conditioning emphasis on maintaining 
legitimacy. 
 
Accordingly, this book is organised into three sections that express and support 
these findings. The first interrogates the contemporary politics of the 
commemoration of race and empire at the halfway point of the Great War 
centenary; the second focuses on case studies of the historical antecedents that 
underlie and shape centennial articulations of race and empire; and the final section 
analyses some of the monumental structures that exemplify the changing treatment 
of race and empire over the past century.  
 
National narratives and politics in an international world 
The research presented here reinforces a simple point that bears repeating: that 
commemorative activity is inescapably political.  This fundamental fact is often 
forgotten amidst the bi-partisan support that war commemoration attracts in liberal 
democracies.  War commemoration is often presented in such democracies as a 
‘national’ activity, therefore free from and ‘above’ politics.  When announcing the 
UK government’s plans for the First World War Centenary at a speech at the Imperial 
War Museum in London in 2012, for example, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
said that the centenary should be ‘a truly national commemoration’ that captured 
‘our national spirit’.  As Andrew Mycock has shown, the word national carried a 
treble meaning in this context: it meant ‘British’ rather than any of the other 
nationalities or ethnic identifications extant in the United Kingdom; it meant 
Commonwealth as well as UK identifications; but it also signified that this was a 
	 3	
‘national’ issue that had been depoliticised before it had been launched.3  Similarly, 
when seeking to introduce the disturbing yet commonplace elements of post-
traumatic stress into Centenary commemorations in Australia, historian Bruce Scates 
was told by one senior public servant that the commemorations should create a 
‘warm fuzzy feeling’ and that the public should not be troubled with tales of suicide 
and lasting trauma that also formed a part of the war and its lasting aftermath.4 
 
However, claiming that commemoration is political is not to deny that this area of 
public policy is easy terrain for politicians.  In November 2013, the already unpopular 
French President François Hollande was criticised for drawing too direct an analogy 
between the Union Sacrée of 1914 and the task of economic rebuilding that faced 
the French people in 2014. 5   On Remembrance Sunday 2015, the Eurosceptic 
organisation Leave.EU was heavily criticised for a tweet linking war dead to 
preserving British freedom and liberties from the European Union. 6   Although 
remembrance narratives are deeply national and carry substantial discursive and 
affective weight, being too overtly partisan is beyond the pale in commemorations. 
 
But it is not this meaning of partisan politics or decisions about the allocations of 
resources for commemorative activities that is at play during commemorations.  
Paradoxically, the first element of the political nature of commemorations is that 
they are deemed apolitical.  This is part of the claim that commemorations are 
‘national’.  Scholars of nationalism have noted this equation between claims to a 
‘national’ status and depoliticisation.  In this view, as John Breuilly has characterised 
it, the nation and its past are presented in public discourse as ‘something beyond 
current politics and ideology, as something which is just “there”’.7  But beneath the 
calm of the commemorative surface, a deeper churn of contestation is taking place.  
For Ashplant, Dawson and Roper ‘the power of dominant memories depends not 
simply on their public visibility, but also on their capacity to connect with and 
																																																								
3 Andrew Mycock, ‘The Politics of the Great War Centenary in the United Kingdom’, in Shanti 
Sumartojo and Ben Wellings, eds., Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilizing the 
Past in Europe, Australia and New Zealand (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), 100-07. 
4 Bruce Scates, Laura James and Rebecca Wheatley, World War One: A History in 100 Stories 
(Melbourne: Penguin Australia), viii. 
5 Michèle Cotta, ‘François Hollande à l'épreuve du consensus oublié’, Le Point, 8 November 2013: 
http://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/michele-cotta/michele-cotta-francois-hollande-a-l-epreuve-
du-consensus-oublie-08-11-2013-1753464_1595.php accessed 2 December 2016. 
6 Matt Chorley, ‘Disgusting! Leave.EU campaign slammed for claiming that staying in the EU threatens 
the freedoms won by the war dead’, Mail Online, 9 November 2015: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3309180/Disgusting-Leave-EU-campaign-slammed-claiming-
staying-EU-threatens-freedoms-won-war-dead.html accessed 2 December 2016. 
7 John Breuilly, ‘Introduction’ in Francois Gemenne and Susana Carvahlo (eds.) Nations and their 
Histories: Constructions and Representations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 18. 
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articulate particular popular conceptions, whilst actively silencing or marginalizing 
others’.8  With regard to war commemoration in particular, they argue that 
 
The primary role of the state in shaping war commemoration highlights its 
fundamental and politicized role in the formation of national identity in the modern 
age.  War provides a symbolic continuity with the national past, as both fighting and 
dying for the nation helps to solidify individual and group national identity’.9 
 
The salience of war memory in creating and informing a sense of nationhood 
becomes significant when we link nationality to a way of understanding the social 
world: in Umut Özkırımlı’s words ‘a particular way of seeing and interpreting the 
world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality 
that surrounds us’.10  John Gillis concurs, arguing that ‘identities and memories are 
not things we think about, but things we think with’.11  From this premise about the 
function rather than the form of identity and memory, Gillis concludes that 
‘Commemorative activity is by definition social and political, for it involves the 
coordination of individual and group memories, whose results may appear 
consensual when they are in fact the product of intense contest, struggle and in 
some cases, annihilation’.12 
 
It is this existential quality that gives memory politics its intensity for those seeking 
to give prominence to their personal or collective remembrance, whilst those who 
do not have to struggle to make themselves heard are puzzled about why the past 
should matter so much.  If we understand politics to be, in Colin Hay’s 
conceptualisation, as ‘the capacity for agency and deliberation in situations of 
genuine collective or social choice’, 13  then we can see that contestation over 
memory becomes one means by which to bring collectivities out of the political-
historical obscurity and into the realm of public recognition. As discussed in this 
book, this has real impact in cotemporary identity politics, with commemorative 
recognition often a part of much larger and more complex histories of racial 
subjugation or injustice. 
 
																																																								
8 Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, ‘The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration: contexts, structures and dynamics’ in Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and 
Michael Roper, The Politics of War Memory: Commemorating War (London: Routledge, 2000), 13. 
9 Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper, The Politics of War Memory, 22. 
10 Umut Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: a Critical Engagement (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave), 30. 
11 John R. Gillis, ‘Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship’ in John R. Gillis ed, 
Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5. 
12 Gillis, The Politics of National Identity, 5. 
13 Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 77. 
	 5	
Furthermore, the politics that underlie the shape and form of commemorations are 
not reserved to the domestic sphere, but can also play out as a form of foreign policy 
(as ‘second track’ or ‘cultural’ diplomacy) and operate in this way as an element of 
international relations and global politics.  The French policy of ‘Shared Memory’ 
illustrates this international element of the organisation of commemorative events 
at the international and national scales. 
 
In its first phase 2003-06, the ‘Shared Memory’ policy emphasised bilateral 
international ties, in principle with former allies or adversaries who shared a military 
history with France since 1870. In practice, the first eight agreements were signed 
with Commonwealth and Cold War allies (Australia, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Canada and South Korea) and former colonies (Morocco, Tunisia, 
Madagascar). The declared objective was to enhance shared memorial heritage on 
French soil.  The consecration of a new Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
(CWGC) cemetery for the Australian and British unmarked graves discovered at 
Fromelles in July 2010 was one tangible outcome of this foreign policy.  
 
In a second phase, which began with the first international summit on shared 
memory in 2006, the policy took a multilateral turn intended to ‘reinforce the links 
between states in the field of war memory’.14  The UNESCO meeting drew together 
twenty-four countries, including six from the Commonwealth, to promote a youth 
agenda, work towards the recognition of colonial veterans’ pensions rights, and 
agree to a biennial calendar of meetings. In the run up to the centenary, this 
bilateralism laid the basis for what was intended as the ‘Europeanisation’ of Great 
War memory at a summit of the Council of Europe presided over by France on 10 
November 2008, including the adoption of European symbols in the 
commemorations and the integration of First World War memory in national history 
syllabuses.  The culmination of French initiatives came with the first of the inter-
ministerial meetings in Paris on 17-18 October 2013 where representatives of thirty 
governments began the preparation and coordination of the Great War centenary 
calendar under the twin themes of the reconciliation of peoples and the dialogue of 
national histories. 
 
While it can claim to have been a diplomatic success as a policy, shared memory has 
failed to convince as an historiographical concept.  For Annette Becker, countries 
such as France and Germany cannot be said to share the same memories even when 
their war histories coincide, nor do the regions of France; there is little in common 
about the way the First World War is remembered in the Midi, Alsace or in Paris: 
 
																																																								
14 UNESCO, ‘Premières rencontres internationales sur la mémoire partagée’, UNESCO, Paris, 26-27 
October 2006. 
	 6	
Europeans shared in mourning the dead, the lives destroyed and the loss of 
illusions. But beyond that, the memory of the war was built differently from 
country to country. There is absolutely no shared memory between the warring 
nations, and sometimes not even within the countries themselves…Even in a 
country like France there is no single memory, so imagine the differences 
between the wars winners and losers.15 
 
Building a European-wide memory of the First World War on a conceptually flawed 
foundation remained problematic.  Jean-Jacques Becker points out that Armistice 
Day does not have the same significance for France and for (most of) the rest of 
Europe where ‘11 November is not the end of the war, but the beginning of the 
storm’.16  Nevertheless, on 28 February 2012, the French parliament persisted in the 
conflation of modern war memories by transforming the Armistice into a homage to 
all those who have died in war for France.  
 
Beyond Europe, with its advanced mechanisms of policy sharing, a conscious re-
working of deliberately forgotten pasts has been evident.  Such a process of 
rediscovery and rehabilitation was observable in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  The ‘real and discursive boundaries’ that Elizabeth Rechniewski noted applied 
to tirailleurs sénégalais applied equally to the experience and memory of Chinese 
labourers on the Western Front.  The employment of Chinese labour from 1916-20 
was a product of the new Chinese Republic’s (unsuccessful) attempts to shape the 
outcome of the post-War period in East Asia.17  After the war and reconstruction the 
majority of the estimated 135, 000 labourers from Shandong province returned to 
China, but after the Communist victory in 1949 these labourers became an 
embarrassment to the Communist Party because they had worked for Western 
Imperialists. 18  However, as Paul Bailey shows in Chapter 2, once the post-Mao era 
of economic reform had stabilised, the People’s Republic of China rehabilitated 
Chinese labourers from the First World War not as ‘coolies’ in the service of western 
imperialism but as trans-national agents in the service of China, this bringing them 
back from post-1949 obscurity. 
 
The memory of the First World War in India has gone through another observable – 
if modest – rehabilitation, although for different reasons to China.  In India the 
ideology from which the memory of Indian participation needed to be rescued was 
																																																								
15 ‘The Sundaily, ‘The historians view: why no shared memory of Great War’, The Sundaily, Sun Media 
Corporation Malaysia, 5 March 2014: http://www.thesundaily.my/news/969181 accessed 3 
November 2014. 
16 Jean-Jacques Becker, L’Europe dans la Grande guerre (Paris : Belin, 1996), 244.  
17 Adam Tooze, The Deluge. The Great War and the Remaking of the Global Order (London: Penguin, 
2014), 100. 
18 Mark O’Neill, The Chinese Labour Corps. The Forgotten Chinese Labourers of the First World War 
(London: Penguin, 2014), 1. 
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nationalism rather than communism.  Not unlike the trajectory of forgetting and 
remembering participation in the Great War in Ireland, the considerable 
contribution to winning the war that came from British India was pushed into 
obscurity by the demands of nationalist memory after 1947.  This ideational 
occlusion was compounded by further political complications, the military 
confrontations between India and Pakistan since independence not least amongst 
them.  But despite the difficulty in gaining access to lieux de mémoire such as the 
war memorial in Basra, the sensitivity towards Christian war cemeteries in Pakistan 
and the destruction or initially incomplete records of the British Indian Army, Peter 
Stanley argues in Chapter 3 that a rehabilitation of Indian soldiers is taking place in 
India.  This intersects with the memory of the conflict in the United Kingdom where 
South Asian communities are encouraged to seek out familial links with the war and 
where the CWGC memorial at Neuve Chappelle has been the site of commemorative 
diplomacy by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.  In comparison with 
commemorations in Europe, the examples from what used to be British India 
highlight the importance of ‘memorial diplomacy’ in facilitating the beginnings of a 
shared memory.19  In the context of fluctuating international relations such as those 
between India and Pakistan, or the instability in Basra leading to the relocation of a 
significant memorial, ‘shared memory’ – with all its limitations – cannot even begin 
to take root, leaving First World War memory in the Indian sub-continent 
permanently partitioned. 
 
The re-emergence of the traces of memory associated with race and empire 
occurred in a historical shift to re-legitimise empire after the end of the Cold War 
and during the ‘War on Terror/Long War’ in the developed world. This was 
accompanied by the emergence of China and India as global powers with 
concomitantly global agendas.  However, if both China and India can bring 
considerable resources to bear to push memory of their contributions to the Great 
War into the realm of international public diplomacy the same cannot be said for the 
Congo.  Although, as Laurence van Ypersele and Enika Ngongo demonstrate in 
Chapter 4, it played a significant part in Belgium’s war, the lack of a Congolese 
presence in the European theatre meant that they have been little remembered in 
the Belgian First World War centenary commemorations.  Keith Jeffery has described 
what he calls a ‘remembrance deficit’ in Africa that is not just related to material 
resources, but also to the forgetting of African contributions by the imperial powers 
during and immediately after the War.  As in British India, a racial hierarchy in death 
meant – certainly in the British case – that porters and askari were rarely recorded 
																																																								
19 Matthew Graves, ‘Memorial Diplomacy in Franco-Australian Relations’, in Shanti Sumartojo and 
Ben Wellings, eds, Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilizing the Past in Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), 169. 
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by name and usually accorded mass graves.20  For van Ypersele and Ngongo a 
combination of administrative division of commemorative organisation combined 
with the historical conditioning of Belgian colonial memory has created this absence 
in Belgium’s centenary commemorations.  The international organisation of 
commemorative activity was the responsibility of the Belgian federal government, 
and relations with the Congo were not strong following the rapid decolonisation of 
the vast central African country in 1959-60.  Despite the work of a small but growing 
diaspora of Congolese people in Belgium to insert remembrance of the war in Africa 
into the commemorative programme, the contribution of Belgium’s African colony 
remained largely forgotten in 2014-18. 
 
A slightly different picture emerges from Aotearoa/New Zealand.  Katherine Smits 
shows in Chapter 5 how opinion amongst Maori iwi (tribe or people) was divided 
during the War as to whether or not to fight for the British, although a Maori 
battalion was eventually raised.  The debate at the time was whether or not to fight 
for the people against whom Maori had been at war in living memory, and who had 
dispossessed those iwi of their lands, leaving them with both Maori and British kings 
but no country.21  A further complication stemmed from the debate over whether 
Maori should fight or whether their principal contribution should consist of labour 
and ceremonial duties performing the haka.  Ultimately the Maori Pioneer Battalion 
raised for the duration allowed some Maori to rediscover a warrior tradition in a 
period of increasing marginalisation within settler New Zealand society.  The 
significant divisions amongst Maori during the First World War found resonance in 
post-imperial Aotearoa/New Zealand over issues of sovereignty and representation, 
difficult issues in a settler society like New Zealand, unlike India and Congo where 
the imperial powers and their colonists departed.  Such issues were overlooked in 
centennial commemorative activities in Aotearoa/New Zealand due to the need to 
present a bicultural logic of post-imperial New Zealand nationhood.  In this way, 
Maori and Pakeha struggled with an over-supply rather than a deficit of memory, 
and an official imperative to create unity out of a history of division. First World War 
commemoration here had the effect noted by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper of 
marginalising and obscuring narratives that do not align with those of the primary 
power holders, in this case the bicultural nation-state.  
 
From this evidence we can conclude that the nation-state – the principal 
organisation with authority to coordinate national and international commemorative 
events – finds it challenging to commemorate the dissonance and dissidence that 
the memory of racism and imperialism pose to legitimising contemporary national 
																																																								
20 Keith Jeffery, 1916. A Global History (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 240-1. 
21 Philippa Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, 2e (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 139. 
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narratives such as biculturalism or multiculturalism.  This should not, however, be 
seen as a simple case of deliberate forgetting.  Instead it is related to the way that 
race and empire – crucial elements in the prosecution and organisation of the First 
World War – had already been misrepresented, hidden and forgotten one hundred 
years ago during the conflict itself.  This initial physical and ideational containment of 
race and empire in the metropole was compounded because as organisational 
concepts they were de-legitimised in the post-colonial era that began during the 
First World War and reached fruition after the Second.   
 
(Mis)representing race and empire, 1900-20 
Although they were hard to discern in contemporary commemorative activities, race 
and empire were major organisational ideologies at the time of the First World War.  
Race, as David Olosuga has shown, determined who could fight and where they 
could fight.22  The 1914-18 fighting in Europe was as ‘white man’s war’ with three 
important exceptions.  The first of these were the so-called Martial Races of the 
British Empire, men drawn from the northern parts of British India, but also Maori 
from New Zealand, who fought in France and Belgium. The second was the Force 
Noire composed of tirailleurs sénégalais and North African Troops who fought in 
France.  A third group were African-Americans who came to France after the USA 
entered the war in 1917, some of whom were integrated in French fighting units. 
 
The deployment of these troops was very controversial at the time, amongst French 
and British populations as much as their German adversaries.  This century old 
controversy is one of the first reasons that race and empire are difficult to 
incorporate into acts of remembrance and commemoration in the 2014-18 period.  
Elizabeth Rechniewski demonstrates in Chapter 6 how troubled authorities were 
during the First World War about the effect that being in France might have for the 
colonial order in French West Africa when the tirailleurs sénégalais eventually 
returned home.  These fears also turned on concerns about exposure to white 
French women during periods of convalescence of hivernage (billeting for colonial 
troops in the warmer south because they were felt to be unsuited to the winters of 
northern France) as well as the corrosive effects on white authority brought about 
by fighting other whites (Germans) in the trenches of the Western Front.  As 
Rechniewski argues, the official response was to hide these troops as much as 
possible, both physically and discursively, which had the effect of consigning them to 
a ‘long-forgotten corner of French social and military history’. 
 
Not all discourses of race in 1914-18 concerned non-white peoples, as the interest in 
Australian and South African fighting men arriving in Marseilles showed.  Deirdre 
Gilfedder points out in Chapter 7 that race was a crucial element shaping the 
																																																								
22 Olusoga, The World’s War, 53-62. 
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thoughts and actions of journalists Charles Bean and Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, both of 
whom helped create fundamental elements of what in 2014-18 was remembered as 
a foundational moment in Australian nationhood.  The idealised image of the Anzac 
that they crafted was heavily influenced by (positive) eugenic thinking whereby the 
Australian environment created ‘a new, strange race’; or rather a new, robust sub-
species of the British race.  In this case, what was understood on the outbreak of the 
First World War as the influence of racial development helped create national 
distinctiveness, yet that also bound Australians to Britons through hereditary ties 
[ref chapter]. In these ways the memory traces of race and empire lived on during 
the First World War centenary, unwittingly borne down the years by the continuity 
present in Anzac commemoration.23   
 
Yet this official concealment had to contend with popular interest in (and at times 
confusion over) the presence of such colonial troops.   Gilles Teulié’s research into 
postcards as ‘memory traces’ reveals this fascination and confusion (see Chapter 8).  
Teulié estimates that 2.2 million postcards were published in France in 1914, making 
them a highly important medium for communicating images of the war and 
especially foreign troops.  It is such a medium that acts as what he calls ‘the first 
circle of memory’; images that are deemed commercially successful, and are then 
transmitted and occasionally preserved until the present day.  The postcards that 
have survived from Marseilles in 1914-18, the disembarkation point for non-
European arrivals from Asia, Africa and Australasia, demonstrate a fascination with 
what were referred to at the time as ‘Indoo’ troops (a collective term often used for 
troops from British India whatever their religion).  But they also reveal confusion, 
with South Africans labelled as Scots (probably because of the kilts worn by South 
African Scottish regiments) and less explicably Ghurkhas labelled as ‘Canadiens’.  
This shows that popular local knowledge of other empires was partial and being 
formulated through the colonial contact generated by the First World War. 
 
A second example of colonial contact afforded by the Great War was the official use 
of images of empire for recruitment purposes.  In the era of high imperialism that we 
associate with the Partition of Africa and imperialist interventions in China, Korea 
and the Philippines, not everyone was agreed that such expansion was a good idea.  
Empires may have been acquired in ‘a fit of absence of mind’, but what were they 
for?  The outbreak of war in 1914 provided a compelling answer to this question: the 
Empire would aid the Mother Country.  In Chapter 9, Cherie Prosser shows that 
representations of colonial troops on recruitment posters served a double purpose: 
they sought to increase enlistment from the colonies when the huge losses required 
more and more men to join the armed forces of Britain and France; and they sought 
to reassure British and French citizens that their respective Empires were united 
																																																								
23 Carolyn Holbrook, Anzac. The Unauthorised Biography (Sydney, New South, 2014), 144-45. 
	 11	
behind the cause.  Although nationalist movements really gained strength in British 
India and North Africa after the conclusion of hostilities, the loyalty of the colonies 
could not be taken for granted, as the Germans and Ottomans tried to exploit.24 
Prosser argues that these geostrategic considerations had the effect of reducing the 
representation of colonial troops to a collection of stereotypes. This in turn 
supported the creation of the illusion of cohesion in the French and British 
metropole and beyond to the colonies themselves. In the case of British India these 
ultimately unhelpful stereotypes created unrealistic expectations about loyalty in the 
colonies that ultimately undermined the imperial endeavour in the inter-War 
years.25 
 
In the cases of the (mis)representations of the tirailleurs, the imperial troops arriving 
in Marseilles, the stereotypes conveyed via recruitment posters and the eugenicist 
elements of the Anzac legend helped create the structures of memory at the 
moment of their creation that subsequently occluded the contribution of subaltern 
groups or shaped collective remembrance thereafter.  This suggests that one 
explanation for the predominant ‘whiteness’ of the 2014-18 centenary 
commemorations in Western states is a product of the organising power of race that 
was dominant in 1914-18. 
 
Entanglements of scale: shared memories and memorialisation 
This is not to suggest, however, that race and empire were totally excluded from 
centenary commemorations.  But the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ structures of political 
and historical power shaping collective memory and remembrance did have an 
effect on where race and empire were commemorated and in what form.  One way 
to understand how the rehabilitation of race and empire in First World War 
commemorations pushed against the unifying nation-state narratives in major 
events, is to consider the different scales of remembering and forgetting.  
Throughout the chapters in this book, political and bureaucratic power at local, 
metropolitan and regional scales all either legitimise the nation differently, or do not 
feel the need to legitimise it at all.  As a result, commemoration of race and empire 
has emerged in ways that can complicate or even pull against state-level activities.  
 
Discourses of race and nation and questions concerning the operation of power and 
legitimacy at national and international levels shape memory of the First World War.  
But these ideational elements must be enacted and made concrete locally with the 
support of municipal and regional government seeking to put a distinctive stamp on 
																																																								
24 Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans. The Great War in the Middle East, 1914-20 (London: 
Penguin, 2015), 70-74. 
25 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share. A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1995, 3e (Harlow, 
Longman, 1996), 263. 
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national and international commemorations.  The history of the First World War in 
Marseilles, the gateway to France and the Western Front for many Allied troops, and 
the contemporary commemoration of that history, exemplifies the conceptual 
framework outlined so far, and highlights the importance of considering scale.   
 
In 2015, a Great War centenary exhibition at the Marseilles city archive called 
‘Marseillais fait ton devoir’! opened its doors. That exhibition was just one of a 
constellation organised by the cities of France behind the lines of the Western Front 
from 2014 under the aegis of the Mission du Centenaire in concert with local, 
departmental and regional government agencies, museums, archives and memorials. 
The exhibit drew on the substantial private collections of souvenirs and mementoes 
acquired by the municipal archives, including Australian press reports of the arrival 
of the ANZAC troops in France in the spring and summer of 1916.  Marseilles was 
described as a city at the crossroad of empires, ‘where races meet to defend France’. 
In its crowded streets, French civilians rubbed shoulders with Ghurkhas, ‘Indians’, 
South Africans, Australians, Senegalais and Tonkinois, as well as German prisoners 
and refugees from the Balkans who make up a ‘jostling, heterogeneous crowds’ in a 
city ‘which feels much closer to the fighting line…than in Paris’. 26  The city was 
presented as a meeting place of East and West and under the heading ‘Prejudices 
broken down’, an Australian journalist drew a moral from its example:  
 
A national calamity has broken down the century-old barriers of distrust and 
misunderstanding. The mother country knows and appreciates the self-sacrifice of her 
distant possessions, while the Australians in their turn have come to realise the 
difficulties and racial prejudices suffered by those at home.27 
 
That the influx of hundreds of thousands of colonial and allied troops during the 
Great War posed fundamental questions about race relations to contemporary 
observers, both at home and abroad, is an aspect of Marseilles’ wartime record that 
was largely neglected in English language histories until the publication of David 
Olusoga’s study of the conflict’s ‘forgotten soldiers’, The World’s War (2015), which 
described how Marseilles was ‘shaken from its peacetime slumber to become a great 
garrison city in which the tribes of empire were gathered for war’.28  
 
In addition to contemporary reports in the French and British press of the patriotic 
fervour which greeted the newcomers, propaganda material in the municipal and 
departmental archives suggest that the exoticism of the soldiers of empire was 
actively promoted as a civilian morale booster.  This material includes a series of 
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information booklets on the allied armies; postcards of colonial and dominion troops 
parading through Marseilles; a fold-out poster map of the British Empire and its 
contribution in manpower and capital to the war effort; the publication in English 
translation of the Franco-Russian artist Massia Bibikoff’s diary-cum-sketchbook of 
the British Indian army divisions in their city encampments;29 and the postcards 
analysed by Giles Tuillé noted above. The captions accompanying the images of ‘our 
Allies in Marseilles’ were explicit: France does not fight alone; the Force noire of the 
French Empire and the ‘martial races’ of the British empire have rallied to the 
nation’s aid; the poilu or citizen-soldier is backed by the volunteers of the Italian 
Garibaldi and Greek émigrés brigades assembled in Provence in defence of the 
Republic before Greece and Italy even entered the War. 
 
Despite this vibrant history, public interest in 2014-18 centenary events in Marseilles 
was muted if not disappointing; perhaps in part because regional memory is the less 
visible underside of national and international commemorative programmes, at a 
remove from the tribunes of memorial politics and diplomacy, and as such at odds 
with the policy of ‘shared memory’ promoted by France since 2002, as noted above.  
Even within the nation-state itself, memories clash and jar between the core and the 
periphery: the opening of hostilities in 1914 is chiefly remembered in the Midi for 
the humiliation of the soldiers of the XV Corps, unjustly accused of deserting the 
battlefield in Lorraine.30  The sole Commonwealth commemorative ceremony of 
note to be held in Marseille by the end of 2016 was a reconstitution of the landing of 
the Sikh soldiers of the Lahore and Meerut divisions at the Monument aux Héros de 
l’Armée d’Orient on 26 September 2014 by the Representative Council of French 
Sikhs, occupying the place left vacant by the Indian government’s reluctance to 
engage in commemorations associated with the era of British rule in India.31  As 
such, it marked a communitarian rather than a national memory.  
 
But it is from between the cracks in national and international commemorative 
activity that subaltern memories emerged.  The politics of commemorating race and 
empire takes on a completely different shape and impact when considered at the 
local, metropolitan, or regional scale.  By shifting away from the nation-state with its 
imperative to seek legitimacy as the dominant power holder in shaping 
commemorative events, the local and regional levels opened up new opportunities 
for commemorative expression. 
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War memorials, for example, lie at the intersection of the national and the local and 
are widespread in both cities and rural battlefield sites.32   Yet this growth of 
memorials was not confined to Europe alone; indeed the selection and construction 
of memorials are even more complicated outside of Europe itself.  All these currents 
of history and ideology are set out and contested at different scales through 
attempts to memorialise race and empire in the context of shifting understandings 
of conflict in settler societies.  The rehabilitation and rediscovery is far from 
uncontroversial and often fiercely contested.  As Liz Recniewski has shown, the 
existence of a First World Memorial in Kone, New Caledonia was cross-cut by 
memory of a revolt by indigénes in 1917 and became contentious again in the 
context of (long-standing) plans for the devolution of power from France.33  Dónal 
Hassett has shown in Chapter 10 how the post-colonial Algerian state literally 
concreted over First World War memorials in Algiers and Oran, thus occluding, but 
not completely erasing, the previous narrative of settler-indigenous brothers-in-arms 
and common endeavour with a post- and anti-colonial nationalist memory. 
 
Drawing evidence from Australia, Ben Wellings and Shanti Sumartojo build their 
analysis of the politics of memorialisation on the related but distinct concepts of 
soldier and warrior, war and conflict, and the differing interpretations of the past 
that these concepts implied (Chapter 11).  Analysing the place of Indigenous 
Australians in First World War commemorations, they find that differing memorial 
expressions of the past have emerged at difference scales of governance.  The 
memory of settler-indigenous conflict means that indigenous memorials were too 
historically freighted to be placed in nationally symbolic sites like the Australian War 
Memorial in Canberra.  Yet although remaining controversial, the commissioning and 
placing of memorials by city governments in urban locations was more frequent and 
less contested between 2013-16.   
 
The nation-state – the principal organisation with authority to conduct the national 
and international coordination of commemorative events – found it challenging to 
commemorate the dissonance and dissidence that the memory of racism and 
imperialism pose to legitimising contemporary national narratives such as 
biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand or multiculturalism in Australia.  However, 
because metropolitan governments are not as heavily invested in the legitimacy of 
the nation, memorials displaying broader intersections with indigenous memories of 
conflict, dispossession and war were built in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne.  It 
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was at this scale that subaltern narratives were able to emerge and complicate 
dominant national-level narratives conditioned by the demands of the international 
system and the racialised memories with their roots in 1914-18. 
 
Conclusions: variable geometries of remembrance 
While the internationalisation of Great War commemoration and its ‘shared 
memory’ has been assiduously pursued since 2002, never more dramatically 
symbolised than by the 72 combatant nations assembled on the Champs Elysées for 
the Bastille Day parade 2014, regional divergences reveal a memory of the First 
World War that is much more complex and contradictory.34  Reading the centenary 
through the prism of ‘memory from below’, as Rémi Dalisson calls it - forms of 
remembrance from below or from the periphery, from behind the front lines and far 
from the zones of combat - decentralises national memory in a way which allows 
subaltern histories to resurface: those of the ‘forgotten soldiers’ of the French and 
British empires and the stark contrasts in their treatment; of the Chinese, Indian, 
Egyptian and Fijian labourers whose histories have begun to be recovered by the 
likes of Paul Bailey, Peter Stanley, David Olusoga and Li Ma.35  It exposes variable 
geometries of remembrance, underscored by regional disparities, and underwritten 
by the continuities and discontinuities in the national histories of the winners and 
losers, the colonial and postcolonial states. 
 
Thus, as we have argued in this chapter, the process of (mis)representing, 
remembering and forgetting race and empire in the First World War centenary has 
been conditioned in three important ways.  The first is that what was 
commemorated and by whom in 2014-18 was shaped by the demands of the nation-
state within the dynamics of the international state system, including through 
processes of ‘memorial diplomacy’, in a ‘horizontal’ analytical axis.  Secondly, 
centenary commemorations were strongly shaped by initial (mis)representation of 
subaltern groups during and immediately after the First World War itself; this legacy 
of attitudes towards race and empire handed down as memory and history can be 
thought of as a ‘vertical’ element in the analysis.  Thirdly, the ‘horizontal’ and 
‘vertical’ flows of memory and commemoration in 2014-18 were complicated and 
transected by scale in metropolitan, regional and international levels of governance; 
and activities at these scales allowed alternative memories to emerge more readily 
that at the level of the nation-state. In the chapters that follow, these arguments will 
be exemplified and deepened by a wide range of new research on the First World 
War, its impact and commemoration, and the ongoing role it plays in contemporary 
society and politics. 
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